This paper investigates, theoretically and empirically, a possibly fundamental aspect of technological progress. If knowledge accumulates as technology progresses, then successive generations of innovators may face an increasing educational burden. Innovators can compensate in their education by seeking narrower expertise, but narrowing expertise will reduce their individual capacities, with implications for the organization of innovative activity -a greater reliance on teamwork -and negative implications for growth. I develop a formal model of this "knowledge burden mechanism" and derive six testable predictions for innovators. Over time, educational attainment will rise while increased specialization and teamwork follow from a sufficiently rapid increase in the burden of knowledge. In cross-section, the model predicts that specialization and teamwork will be greater in deeper areas of knowledge while, surprisingly, educational attainment will not vary across fields. I test these six predictions using a micro-data set of individual inventors and find evidence consistent with each prediction. The model thus provides a parsimonious explanation for a range of empirical patterns of inventive activity. Upward trends in academic collaboration and lengthening doctorates, which have been noted in other research, can also be explained by the model, as can muchdebated trends relating productivity growth and patent output to aggregate inventive effort. The knowledge burden mechanism suggests that the nature of innovation is changing, with negative implications for long-run economic growth. * I wish to thank
Introduction
Understanding innovation is central to understanding many important aspects of economics, from market structure to aggregate growth. Innovators, in turn, are a necessary input to any innovation. The innovator, wrestling with a creative idea, working with colleagues, bringing an idea to fruition, seems the very heart of the innovative process. This paper places innovators at the center of analysis and focuses on two simple observations. First, innovators are not born at the frontier of knowledge; rather, they must initially undertake significant education. Second, the frontier of knowledge shifts over time. The purpose of this paper is to investigate equilibrium implications of these two observations and then test these implications empirically. The theory and empirical work below suggest possibly fundamental consequences for the organization of innovative activity and, in the aggregate, for growth.
The first observation concerns human capital and highlights a general distinction between human capital and other stock variables. Physical stocks can be transferred easily, as property rights, from one agent to another. Human capital, by contrast, is not transferred easily. While one generation may rather effortlessly bequeath its physical assets to the next, with human capital stocks, this is fundamentally not the case. The vessel of human capital -the individual -absorbs information at a limited rate, has limited capacity, and has limited time on earth. The difficulty of transferring human capital has broad implications in economics 1 ; in this paper, I focus on basic implications for innovation.
The second observation concerns the total stock of knowledge. In 1676, Isaac Newton wrote famously to Robert Hooke, "If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of giants." Newton's sentiment suggests that knowledge begets new knowledge, an observation that has been formalized in the growth literature (Romer 1990 , Jones 1995a , Weitzman 1998 ) with implications discussed extensively both there (e.g. Jones 1995b, Kortum 1997 , Young 1998 ) and in the micro-innovation literature (e.g. Scotchmer 1991 , Henderson & Cockburn 1996 . This paper suggests a different, indirect implication of Newton's observation: if one is to stand on the shoulders of giants, one must first climb up their backs, and the greater the body of knowledge, the harder this climb becomes.
If technological progress leads to an accumulation of knowledge, then the educational burden on successive cohorts of innovators will increase. Innovators might confront this difficulty by choosing to learn more. Alternatively, they might compensate by choosing narrower expertise -a "death of the Renaissance Man" effect. Choosing to learn more will leave less time in the life-cycle for innovation. Narrowing expertise, meanwhile, can reduce individual capabilities and force innovators to work in teams. Intriguing evidence along the lines of a "learning more" effect can be seen in Table 1 , which borrows from Jones (2005) .
We see that the mean age at which great inventors and Nobel Prize winners produced their great innovations increased by 6 years over the course of the 20th Century. To help motivate the second set of effects, consider the invention of the microprocessor. As described by Malone (1995) In fact, probably only one person in the world did know how to do the next step. That was Federico Faggin... The microprocessor was one person's inspiration, but several people's invention. It is the story of researchers with circumscribed abilities, working in a team, and it helps motivate the model of innovation and the empirical work in this paper.
In the model, presented in Section 2, innovators are specialists who interact with each other in the implementation of their ideas. The model introduces a "circle of knowledge" -a continuum of types of knowledge -upon which innovators define their specialties and locate necessary teammates. Achieving expertise in any area on the circle requires an innovator to bring herself to the frontier of knowledge in that area, and the difficulty of reaching the frontier -the burden of knowledge -may increase or decrease over time.
The central choice problem is that of career. At birth, each individual chooses to become either a production worker or an innovator. Innovators must further choose a specific area of knowledge to learn. They choose their degree of specialization as a tradeoff between the costs and benefits of education: greater knowledge leads to increased innovative potential, but it also costs more to acquire. Innovators also seek to avoid crowding: other things equal, the greater the density of innovators in a particular area of knowledge, the less expected income each will earn. The equilibrium defines the educational decisions of innovators -the total amount of education they seek, their degree of specialization, and their consequent propensity to form teams.
Career choices are made in a dynamically evolving economy. The model marries the burden of knowledge mechanism with two established insights in the growth and innovation literatures. First, a growing population increases market size, making innovations more valuable and attracting workers to the innovative sector. The importance of introducing such scale effects from an aggregate growth perspective was first pointed out by Jones (1995a) . In this model, increasing market size also plays a key role by increasing the marginal value of education, thereby increasing the amount of education innovators wish to seek. Second, the value of knowledge may be increasing or decreasing as the economy evolves. This feature captures, in reduced-form, a broad range of arguments in the literature:
both fishing-out ideas (e.g. Kortum 1997 ), as well as more optimistic specifications where knowledge is increasingly useful (e.g. Romer 1990 , Aghion & Howitt 1992 ). An increasing value of knowledge will tend, ceteris paribus, to increase the marginal benefit of education.
Finally, the difficulty in reaching the knowledge frontier -the burden of knowledge -may rise or fall as the economy evolves.
In this framework the same forces that influence innovators' educational decisions also influence long-run growth. Indeed, the tight link between individual income possibilities and changes in the knowledge space produces detailed predictions about innovator behavior on the one hand and aggregate consequences on the other, allowing this model to explain both micro and aggregate data patterns. The crux of the model is that income possibilities determine career decisions. Therefore, any increase in the burden of knowledge cannot be analyzed in isolation but must be weighed against both the value of this knowledge and other income opportunities when innovators make their career choices. Moreover, any simple intuition that areas of "greater knowledge" require more education and/or more specialization turns out to have important and empirically relevant qualifications. Along the balanced growth path, the income possibilities of innovation expand -because market size and/or the value of ideas are increasing -so that new cohorts will seek more education over time. Given this increasing educational attainment, innovators will only become more specialized if the burden of knowledge mechanism is sufficiently strong. More subtly, 3 income arbitrage produces the surprising result that educational attainment will not vary across technological fields, regardless of variation in the burden of knowledge or innovative opportunities.
In all, the model makes six testable predictions for the behavior of individual innovators.
In time series, the model predicts that (i) educational attainment will be rising while (ii) specialization and (iii) teamwork will increase only if the burden of knowledge is increasing at a sufficient rate. In cross-section, the model predicts that (iv) specialization and hence (v) teamwork will be greater in fields where knowledge is deeper. At the same time, (vi) educational attainment should show no variation across technological fields.
Section 3 tests these six predictions empirically. Using a rich patent data set (Hall et al. 2001 ) together with the results of a new data collection exercise to determine the ages of 55,000 inventors, I am able to develop detailed patent histories for individuals. As shown in Figure 1 , I find that the age at first innovation, which can serve as a proxy measure for educational attainment, is trending upwards at 0.6 years per decade. Meanwhile, U.S. team size is seen to be increasing at a remarkably steep rate of 17% per decade, and a direct measure for specialization is increasing by 6% per decade. As discussed in Section 3, these trends are all robust to a number of controls, and in particular are robust across a wide range of technological categories and research environments.
In cross-section, I find striking support for the model's perhaps less obvious prediction that educational attainment will be similar across fields. At the same time, team size and the specialization measure vary substantially across fields, and, as predicted, are larger where the amount of knowledge underlying each patent is larger.
The model thus serves as a parsimonious explanation for this collection of new facts.
Starting with simple observations about human capital and knowledge, we are led to test basic predictions about innovator behavior and to uncover substantial variations across fields and over time. As discussed in Section 4, the model can further explain several facts that have been documented elsewhere, including upward trends in academic coauthorship and doctoral duration. Lastly, in the aggregate, the model provides one consistent explanation for existing facts debated by growth economists. First, R&D employment in leading economies has been rising dramatically, yet TFP growth has been flat (Jones, 1995b) . Second, the average number of patents produced per R&D worker or R&D dollar has been falling over time across countries (Evenson 1984 ) and U.S. manufacturing industries (Kor-tum 1993). These aggregate data trends can be seen in the model as an effect of increasingly narrow expertise, where innovators are becoming less productive as individuals and are required to work in ever larger teams. Section 4 reviews the results, connects them to existing literatures, and further discusses their implications.
The Model
The over-arching theme of this model is the emphasis on innovators. I analyze a simple structure with two sectors: a production sector where competitive firms produce a homogenous output good and an innovation sector where innovators produce productivity-enhancing ideas. Workers in the production sector earn a competitive wage while innovators earn income by licensing their ideas to firms in the production sector. I abstract from physical capital and focus on the role of human capital in the innovation sector. Innovators must undertake a costly human capital investment to bring themselves to the knowledge frontier where they become able to innovate. Innovators face a tradeoff between the costs of seeking more education and the benefits of achieving a broader degree of expertise. This tradeoff will be balanced differently by different cohorts as the economy evolves. Section 2.1 describes the production sector and Section 2.2 defines individuals' lifecycles and preferences. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 focus on innovators. The first describes the knowledge space and the cost of education. The second considers the innovation process and the value of ideas. Section 2.5 defines individuals' equilibrium choices. Section 2.6 analyzes steady-state growth, and Section 2.7 examines the time-series predictions of the model. Section 2.8 extends the model to investigate its predictions across technological areas at a point in time. The predictions of Sections 2.7 and 2.8 are the foundation for the empirical analysis in Section 3.
The Production Sector
Competitive firms in the production sector produce a homogenous output good. A firm j hires an amount of labor, l j (t), to produce output, y j (t) = X j (t)l j (t). The productivity level of firm j is X j (t) ≤ X(t), where X(t) is the leading edge of productivity in the economy, which can be achieved by any firm with access to the entire set of productive ideas.
The firm pays workers a wage, w(t), and makes royalty payments per worker of r(t) on any patented technologies it employs. While patent protection lasts, the monopolist innovator will charge a firm a fee, per period, equivalent to all the extra output the firm can produce with the innovation, and the firm will be just willing to pay this fee. Therefore X j (t) = X(t) ∀j, and the total output in the economy is:
The revenues of these competitive firms are dispensed entirely in wage and royalty payments,
The competitive wage paid to a production worker is therefore:
Workers and Preferences
There is a continuum of workers of measure L(t) in the economy at time t. This population grows at rate g L . Individuals are risk neutral and face a constant hazard rate φ of death.
They share a common intertemporal utility function, 2
I assume that individuals are born without assets and supply a unit of labor inelastically at all points over their lifetime. From the standard intertemporal budget constraint, the individual's utility is equivalent to the present value of her expected lifetime non-interest income.
The choice problem is that of career. At birth, an individual decides whether to become a wage worker or an innovator. Wage workers require no education and their expected utility is simply the discounted flow of the wage payments they receive:
If an individual i chooses to be an innovator instead, then she must further choose a specific field of expertise and pay an immediate fixed cost of education, E, to bring herself to the frontier of knowledge in that area. Having paid this cost, the innovator earns an expected flow of income, v, by licensing any innovations she produces to firms in the production sector. In the model, both v and E are specific to the choice of expertise made by an individual (i). The educational cost will also depend on the state of knowledge at the time of birth (τ ), and income flows will further depend on the current state of the economy (t). The expected lifetime utility of an innovator is written generally as,
The structure of the innovator's educational choice and the functional forms of v and E are the subject of the next two subsections.
Note that an extended model can further allow for educational time, so that education has an opportunity cost (foregone income) in addition to any out-of-pocket cost. The simpler model presented here provides the same themes as the extended model, so this paper will feature the simpler case; the extended model is provided in the Appendix.
Knowledge and Education
A type of knowledge is defined by its position, s, on the unit circle. For example, one segment of the circle might represent electronics, another biochemistry, another economics.
At a point in time, the amount of knowledge at each point on the circle is assumed to be the same. 3 I define this quantity as D(t).
The prospective innovator chooses an area of expertise: a point, s i , on the circle and a certain distance, b i ∈ [0, 1], to its right. For an innovator born at time τ , the amount of knowledge the innovator acquires is the chosen breadth of expertise, b i , multiplied by the prevailing depth of knowledge, D(τ ). The educational cost of acquiring this information is:
where ε > 0, which says only that learning more requires a greater amount of education. I make no a priori assumption about whether education costs are convex or concave in the amount of information the innovator learns.
With the assumption that the depth of knowledge is evenly arrayed around a unit circle, the total depth of knowledge at a point in time is D(t). In general, the depth of knowledge will change as innovators produce new ideas. However, while these new ideas serve to increase the productivity in the economy, X(t), they may or may not increase D(t). I write,
with no assumption regarding the sign of δ. It may be natural to assume that the production of new ideas in the R&D sector leads to an increase in D(t) -a rising burden of knowledge.
However, we might also imagine that new ideas either replace old ideas or simplify ideas so that D(t) may actually fall as productivity rises. This latter interpretation is consistent with the concept of revolutionary "paradigm shifts", which Thomas Kuhn has suggested as the appropriate model of scientific progress (Kuhn 1962) . 
Innovation
Once educated, innovators begin to receive innovative ideas. Ideas arrive randomly, with hazard rate λ for a unit-mass of individuals. When an idea arrives, it comes with two further properties. The first is the random breadth of expertise, k, required to implement the idea. The second is the size of the idea, which adds to TFP by an amount γ. 4 The required expertise, k, may be greater or less than the inspired innovator's own expertise, b i . The breadth of the idea k ∈ [0, 1] is drawn from a smooth distribution function F . It is measured as a distance to the right from an individual's location s i , so that the implementation of the idea requires expertise over the segment of the circle [s i , s i + k]. Therefore, with probability F (b i ) the innovator is able to implement the idea alone, and with probability 1 − F (b i ) the innovator needs at least one partner. That is, I
allow for the formation of teams.
I assume that the innovator with the idea acts as a monopolist vis-a-vis potential teammates so that, by Bertrand reasoning, the inspired innovator receives all profits from the project. I further assume that once an idea arrives it can be implemented instantaneously and without any expenditure (in particular, team formation is costless). Therefore, (i) all projects are profitable, (ii) the inspired, monopolist innovator will receive the entire royalty stream from the project as personal income, and (iii) any necessary teammates will be just willing to help without compensation. 5 I make two further assumptions regarding team formation. The inspired innovator will choose team members from her own cohort if possible and assemble the minimum number of people necessary to implement the idea. These assumptions are innocuous and are made to permit explicit analysis of average team size in Sections 2.7 and 2.8.
Given that an idea can be licensed for use by L Y workers, and patent protection lasts for z years, the market size for a patent is:
and the lump-sum value of the patent is therefore V (t) = γM (t). 6 The expected flow of income to an innovator is v = λV , the probability of having an idea at a point in time times the income the idea generates. Using the definition of V , we can write v = λγM . The expected flow of income is therefore equivalently understood as the expected rate at which the innovator adds to TFP, λγ, times the market size for the innovation. When considering the time lag between an innovator's innovations, it will be useful to consider λ and γ separately. However, in determining equilibrium choices, I wish to emphasize that the combination of these parameters is the important primitive. I will 5 The only possible obstacle to implementation is an absence of required expertise. Anticipating the equilibrium of this model, innovators' collective expertise will cover the entire circle of knowledge, so that all ideas are feasible and therefore all ideas will in fact be implemented. To avoid burdensome notation in the text, I will write the rest of the model assuming this result. The Appendix considers the general case and establishes this result as part of any (subgame perfect) equilibrium. 6 This expression is written assuming the innovator has access to a competitive financial market which will pay the innovator the lump-sum value of the patent (or an equivalent annuity) in exchange for the patent rights. If no such market were available, the value of the patent to the innovator would need to reflect the possibility that the innovator dies before the patent rights expire, in which case V = γ therefore define θ = λγ as a summary measure of innovator productivity and, for brevity, proceed in defining the final pieces of the model on the basis of θ.
Specifically, I assume that innovator productivity will depend on three things: (1) the level of technology; (2) the current degree of competition in the innovator's specialty; and (3) the innovator's breadth of expertise. In particular, I write,
where X(t) is the productivity level in the economy, L(t, s i ) is the mass of individuals at time t who share the innovator's specialty, and b i is the innovator's breadth of expertise.
These reduced-form specifications capture several key ideas. The parameter χ represents the impact of the state of technology on an innovator's productivity. It incorporates the standard ideas in the literature which were alluded to in the introduction: "fishingout" hypotheses whereby innovators' productivity falls as the state of knowledge advances (χ < 0), and "positive intertemporal spillovers" whereby an improving state of knowledge makes innovators more productive (χ > 0). 7 The parameter σ represents the impact of crowding on the frequency of an innovator's ideas. I assume σ > 0, following standard arguments where innovators partly duplicate each other's work. A greater density of workers in the same specialty increases duplication, reducing the rate at which a specific individual produces a novel idea.
The final parameter, β, represents the impact of the breadth of expertise. A specification with β > 0 suggests simply that greater human capital increases one's productivity. The specific reason I embrace, for the purposes of this model, is that individuals with broader expertise access a larger set of available knowledge -facts, theories, methods -on which to build innovations. This will increase their innovative abilities, along the lines of Weitzman (1998), making them more productive. 8 Finally, I can now explicitly define an innovator's expected flow of income,
Equilibrium Choices
The choice facing each individual is that of career, which is a one-shot decision made at birth. Define the set of individuals born at time τ as l(τ ), of which a subset l Y (τ ) choose the production sector and a subset l R (τ ) choose the innovation sector instead. Those who choose the innovation sector must additionally choose an area of expertise (s, b). In equilibrium, we require two conditions for each cohort τ :
The first condition states that no innovator can deviate to any other educational choice and be better off. The second condition rules out income arbitrage possibilities between the R&D and production sectors. With the definitions of the model in Sections 2.1 through 2.4, we can now define the expected income from various choices and hence, with conditions (11) and (12), the equilibrium outcome.
Production workers
Production workers receive a competitive wage w(t) = X(t) − r(t), as defined in (2). Since patents are protected for z years, the flow of royalty payments r(t) is simply X(t) − X(t − z) and therefore w(t) = X(t − z). In other words, the wage earned by a production worker is that portion of productivity which is not patent-protected, which is just the productivity level of the economy z years previously.
Choosing to be a production worker therefore provides lifetime income of
which reduces the necessary team size, will bring one a greater share of project income. These last two effects will lead more narrowly expert innovators to abandon a greater portion of their broad ideas.
Innovators
The innovator makes an educational choice to maximize lifetime income. With the objective function (5), and given the definitions for education cost and expected income flow in (6) and (10), the innovator's problem is:
The proofs for all propositions and their corollaries are presented in the Appendix.
Result (i) says that innovators will evenly array themselves around the circle of knowledge. The intuition is straightforward. Given that σ > 0, duplication lowers income.
In consequence, the innovator seeks to avoid crowding and chooses a location where the density of innovators is smallest. In equilibrium, no innovator will wish to deviate from her choice of s i , in which case all innovators must array themselves evenly around the unit circle.
Result (ii) says that educational expenditure and lifetime income are in constant ratio across individuals and cohorts. This result follows from the choice of the breadth of expertise, b i . The innovator chooses b i so that the marginal cost of education equals the marginal expected benefit to her income. The isoelastic properties of v and E with respect to the breadth of expertise then guarantee a constant ratio of E * /U * . This type of result is familiar from Cobb-Douglass type specifications. The innovator pays an additive cost to acquire b, the breadth of expertise, which is an isoelastic input to the innovator's "production function", v. As is well known from the Cobb-Douglass case, the expenditure share on the input is a constant fraction of the income. This result is a key property of the equilibrium, from which many other results will follow. As a first example, the third part of the proposition follows directly. Arbitrage in career choices implies that U * must be the same across individuals in the same cohort. Therefore, since E * /U * is constant, educational expenditure (E * ) must also be constant across innovators within a cohort, implying a common breadth of expertise (b * ).
Steady-state Growth
Given Proposition 1, we will now examine the balanced-growth path and consider the implications of the knowledge burden mechanism for aggregate growth. If there are L R (t)
innovators active at a point in time and innovators raise productivity in the economy on average at a rate _ θ(t), then productivity increases per unit of time are simply dX/dt = _ θ(t)L R (t). The growth rate of productivity is then,
This expression is mechanical and holds both inside and outside of steady-state. On the balanced growth path we can further re-express g as function of exogenous parameters.
Proposition 2 Along a balanced growth path, the growth rate is
where (16),
so that new cohorts of innovators become more specialized with time if and only if δ > 1/ε.
This specialization condition is intuitive: it says that people will specialize more with time if the depth of knowledge in the economy rises relatively quickly given the ease with which knowledge can be learned. 9 If this condition is satisfied, we will witness the "death of the Renaissance Man" along the growth path (g b * < 0). The impact of specialization on growth will be large or small depending on the value of β, which defines the sensitivity of innovators' productivity to their breadth of expertise. 10 Expression (16) also shows that growth in per-capita income depends on population growth, g L . This is the standard Jones (1995b) style result, where increasing effort is needed to produce steady-state growth. A growing population provides both the motiveincreasing market size -and the means -more minds -for innovative effort to grow at an exponential rate, even if innovation is getting harder. The alternative, Romer (1990) style result, where growth can be sustained with constant effort, is obtained in the knife-edge case
The burden of knowledge mechanism (captured by β(δ − 1 ε )) is therefore felt either by (i) pushing us toward a world where ever-increasing effort is needed to sustain steady growth or (ii) producing lower growth rates given that we are already in that world.
Essentially, the greater the growth in the burden of knowledge, the greater must be the growth in the value of knowledge to compensate. Articulated views of why innovation may be getting harder in the growth literature (Kortum 1997 , Segerstrom 1998 ) have focused on a "fishing out" idea; that is, on the parameter χ. The innovation literature also tends to focus on "fishing out" themes (e.g. Evenson 1991 , Cockburn & Henderson, 1996 . This paper offers the burden of knowledge as an alternative mechanism, one that makes innovation harder, acts similarly on the growth rate, and can explain aggregate data trends (see Section 4). Most importantly, the model makes specific predictions about the behavior of individual innovators, allowing one to get underneath the aggregate facts and test for a possible rising burden of knowledge using micro-data. These predictions are defined in the next two sub-sections.
Time Series Predictions
Given the equilibrium properties defined in Proposition 1, we can derive three features of innovator behavior over time. 10 In a model with a time cost for education, an increasing burden of knowledge is also felt through increased educational time, as this reduces the portion of the life-cycle left over to actively pursue innovations. The Appendix considers this more general model. 11 Of course, if χ + β( 1 ε − δ) = 1 then growth will explode if gL > 0 (see (16) ). This "scale effect" makes this knife-edge case inconsistent with aggregate data patterns, a problem discussed in detail elsewhere (Jones 1995b; Jones 1999 ).
Corollary 1 Along the balanced growth path
The first result says that educational attainment of successive cohorts increases along the growth path. Since the value of education to innovators is complementary to growing income possibilities -due to increasing market size if nothing else -innovator cohorts will seek more education over time. In equilibrium the optimal amount of education is a fixed fraction of the innovator's lifetime income -see Proposition 1. As the economy grows, individual incomes grow at rate g. In consequence, the amount of education innovators seek also grows at rate g. 12 Note that increasing educational attainment is not driven in equilibrium by an increasing educational burden: rather, it is driven by the expanding benefits that education affords.
Along the growth path, educational attainment will rise regardless of whether the distance to the frontier is increasing.
This equilibrium property provides further intuition for the second result, regarding specialization, which was discussed in the prior section. Increasing educational attainment implies that δ > 1/ε, rather than δ > 0, is required for expertise to narrow along the growth path. That is, given increasing educational attainment, the knowledge stock must not only grow, but grow at a sufficiently high rate to result in narrowing expertise. The third result, the behavior of average team size, team(t), follows the same condition as specialization.
This result should seem intuitive: more specialized workers rely more on teamwork for the implementation of their ideas. 13 
Cross-sectional Predictions
In this section I extend the model to consider variations across technological areas. The extension considers J unit circles of knowledge in place of a single circle. I assume that the elasticity parameters are the same across all areas of knowledge, while each circle has a specific depth of knowledge D j and a separate parameter A j , which represents the relative productivity of knowledge in that area -whether the area is hot or cold. The structure of the model is as before, with two modifications. First, the difficulty of reaching the knowledge frontier will differ across technological areas. The educational cost for each area j is:
Second, an innovator's productivity will depend on the characteristics of the technological area. I redefine θ as
This specification differs in two ways from that in equation (9). First, the congestion effects are now specific to the particular technological area, which is indicated by adding the subscript j to L(t, s i ). Second, I add the new parameter, A j (t), to indicate sector specific research opportunities. Innovators' inspirations are drawn from a distribution
, so that all ideas from an innovator operating in area j are implementable using expertise within that circle of knowledge.
The innovator's maximization problem is solved just as in Section 2.5, only we now consider the choice problem within a particular area of knowledge j. This generalized model results in a simple generalization of Proposition 1.
Proposition 3
Innovators choose a pair (s ij , b ij ) and a circle j such that
The results of Proposition 3 follow the same logic as Proposition 1. Innovators spread out to avoid duplicating each other. They choose their breadth of expertise such that educational expenditure and lifetime income are in constant ratio. Result (iii) and the central cross-sectional implications follow directly from this latter property.
Corollary 2 The equilibrium implies that for any cohort τ
The first result says that innovators will choose the same amount of education across sectors, regardless of differences in the depth of knowledge or innovation opportunities.
This result is perhaps surprising, but the intuition is straightforward. Innovators allocate themselves across sectors so that differences in the degree of congestion will offset the variation in technological opportunities or educational burden. Once income is equated across sectors, innovators acquire the same total education because their optimal amount of education is a constant fraction of their expected income. The model thus makes the interesting dual prediction that successive cohorts of innovators will choose an increasing amount of education, while a given innovator cohort will choose an identical amount of education across widely different sectors.
In contrast, while we expect no variation in the level of education across sectors, we do expect differences in specialization and teamwork. Given that total educational attainment will be the same across sectors, those sectors with deeper knowledge must consequently see narrower expertise (Corollary 2.ii). In consequence, team size will be greater where the depth of knowledge is greater (Corollary 2.iii).
Econometric Evidence
Sections 2.7 and 2.8 motivate a number of investigations. The goal of the empirical work is descriptive: to examine a range of first-order facts that, together, shed light on these predictions and the model's underlying parameters. Using an augmented patent data set, we will be able to examine four outcomes in particular: The data is described in the following subsection. An investigation of basic time trends and cross-sectional results follow. Section 4 will consider interpretations of the new results as a whole and relate them to existing facts about innovation and growth. Together they paint a multi-dimensional picture that is consistent with a rapidly increasing burden of knowledge.
Data
I make extensive use of a patent data set put together by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (Hall • Team Size. The number of inventors listed with each patent.
• Time Lag. The delay between consecutive patent applications from the same inventor.
For the latter measure, we identify inventors by their last name, first name, and middle initial and then build detailed patent histories for each individual.
We can also define two more approximate measures that will be useful for analysis:
• Tree Size. The size of the citations "tree" behind any patent. Any given patent will cite a number of other patents, which will in turn cite further patents, and so on. For the purposes of cross-sectional analysis, the number of nodes in a patent's backwards-looking patent tree serves as a proxy measure for the amount of underlying knowledge.
• Field Jump. The probability that an innovator switches technological areas between consecutive patent applications. This can serve as a proxy measure for the specialization of innovators. The more specialized you are, the less capable you are of switching fields.
A limitation of this last measure is that, since technological categories are assigned to patents and not to innovators, inferring an innovator's specific field of expertise is difficult when innovators work in teams. For inventors who work in teams, the relation between specialization and field jump is in fact ambiguous: as inventors become more specialized and work in larger teams, they may jump as regularly as they did before. For the specialization analysis we will therefore focus on solo inventors, for whom increased specialization is always associated with a decreased capability of switching fields.
Finally, we would like to investigate the age at first innovation. Unfortunately, inventors' dates of birth are not available in the data set, nor from the USPTO generally.
However, using name and zip code information it was possible to attain birth date information for a large subset of inventors through a public website, www.AnyBirthday.com.
AnyBirthday.com uses public records and contains birth date information for 135 million Americans. The website requires a name and zip code to produce a match. Using a java program to repeatedly query the website, it was found that, of the 224,152 inventors for whom the patent data included a zip code, AnyBirthday.com produced a unique match in 56,281 cases. The age data subset and associated selection issues are discussed in detail in the Data Appendix. The analysis there shows that the age subset is not a random sample of the overall innovator population. This caveat should be kept in mind when examining the age results, although it is mitigated by the fact that the differences between the groups become small when explained by other observables, controlling for these observables in the age regressions has little effect, and the results for team size, specialization and time lag persist when looking in the age subset. See the discussion in the Data Appendix.
Time series results
I consider the evolution over time of our four outcomes of interest. Figure 1 presents the basic data while Tables 2 through 5 examine the time trends in more detail.
Consider team size first. The upper left panel of Figure 1 shows that team size is increasing at a rapid rate, rising from an average of 1.70 in 1975 to 2.25 at the end of the period, for a 32% increase overall. Table 2 by "assignee code" to control for the type of institution that owns the patent rights shows that the upward trend also prevails in each of the seven ownership categories identified in the data, indicating that the trend is robust across corporate, government, and other research settings, both in the U.S. and abroad. 14 In short, we find an upward trend in team size that is both general and remarkably steep.
Next consider the age at first innovation. Note that we define an innovator's "first" innovation as the first time they appear in the data set. Since we cannot witness individuals' patents before 1975, this definition is dubious for (i) older individuals, and (ii) observations of "first" innovations that occur close to 1975. To deal with these two problems, I will limit the analysis to those people who appear for the first time in the data set between the ages of 25 and 35 and after 1985. The upper right panel of Figure 1 plots the average age over time, where we see a strong upward trend. The basic time trend in Table 3 shows an average increase in age at a rate of 0.66 years per decade. Controlling for compositional biases due to shifts in technological fields or team size has no effect on the estimates. The results are also similar when looking at different age windows. 15 Analysis of trends within technological categories shows that the upward trend in age is quite general. Smaller sample sizes tend to reduce significance when the data is finely cut, but an upward age trend is found in all 6 technology classes using Hall et al's 6-category measure, and in 29 of 36 categories when using their 36-category measure. The upward age trend also persists across all patent ownership classifications. Now we turn to specialization. The specialization measure considers the probability that an innovator switches fields between consecutive innovations. Before looking at the raw data, it is necessary to consider a truncation problem that may bias us toward finding increased specialization over time. The limited window of our observations means that the maximum possible time lag between consecutive patents by an innovator is largest in 1975 and smallest in 1999. This introduces a downward bias over time in the lag between innovations. It is intuitive, and it turns out in the data, that people are more likely to jump fields the longer they go between innovations. 16 Mechanically shorter lags as we move closer to 1999 can therefore produce an apparent increase in specialization. To combat this problem, I make use of a conservative and transparent strategy. I restrict the analysis to a subset of the data that contains only consecutive innovations which were made within the same window of time. In particular, we will look only at consecutive innovations when the second application comes within 3 years of the first. Furthermore, we will look only at innovations which were granted within 3 years of the application. 17 This strategy eliminates the bias problem at the cost of limiting our data analysis to the 1975-1993 period and making our results applicable only to the sub-sample of "faster" innovators. 18 The lower right panel of Figure 1 shows the trend from 1975-1993. Table 4 considers the trend in specialization with and without this corrective strategy.
The results there, together with the graphical presentation in Figure 1 , indicate a smooth 16 An interpretation consistent with the spirit of the model is that people need time to reeducate themselves when they jump fields, hence a field jump is associated with a larger time lag. 17 Looking only at patents where the second application came within 3 years limits our analysis to those cases where the first application was made before 1997. However, a second issue is that patents are granted with a delay -2 years on average -and only patents that have been granted appear in the data. For a first patent applied for in 1996, it is therefore much more likely that we will witness a second patent applied for in 1997 than one applied for in 1999 -introducing further downward bias in the data. To deal completely with the truncation problem, we will therefore further limit ourselves to patents which were granted within 3 years of their application, which means that we will only look at the period 1975-1993. 18 These restrictions maintain a significant percentage of the original sample. For example, of the 111,832 people who applied successfully for patents in 1975, 81,955 of them received a second patent prior to 2000. Of these 81,955 people for whom we can witness a time lag between applications, 79.8% made their next application within three years. Of those, 88.5% were granted both patents within three years of application. decrease in the probability of switching fields. The decline is again quite steep. Using the central estimate for the trend of -.003, we can interpret a 6% increase in specialization every ten years. Note that our main results, and Figure 1 , use the 414-category measure for technology to determine whether a field switch has occurred. This is our most accurate we find that the probability of switching fields is declining in 34 of the 36; the decline is statistically significant in 20. In sum, we see a robust and strongly decreasing tendency for solo innovators to switch fields.
Finally, I consider the time lag between an innovator's innovations. The truncation bias in the time lag described above, which had little effect with specialization, is of course crucial here, so we employ the same corrective strategy and look only at the [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] period and the sub-sample of "faster" innovators. The lower left panel of Figure 1 presents the data graphically and Table 5 considers the trend with and without various controls.
The regressions show a mild upward trend, but this should be viewed skeptically given the clearly cyclical behavior we see in the graph. Considering the coefficients on various controls, we see that bigger teams innovate faster and that part of the mild upward trend is accounted for by a composition effect -innovators switching into fields where the delay is longer. What is most interesting about the time lag data becomes apparent only when we look at trends within technological categories. Here we find a richer story: Most fields (19 of 36) show a significant decrease in the average lag between innovations. A smaller number (11 of 36) show a significant increase. 19 Overall, I conclude that the average time lag between an innovator's patent applications, unlike the other outcomes of interest, shows no decisive trend; rather, trends in time lags are cycling and differ strongly across 19 The fact that the overall trend is upward indicates that this group of 11 is pulling relatively strongly. Upon closer examination we find that the heavyweights among these eleven are Organic Compounds (#14), Drugs (#31), and Biotechnology (#33) -all areas related to the pharmaceutical industry. This result is consistent with Henderson & Cockburn's (1996) finding that researchers in the pharmaceutical industry are having a greater difficulty in producing innovations over time.
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technological areas.
Cross-section results
For a first look at the data in cross-section, Table 6 Finally, the last columns of the table consider the probability that a solo innovator will switch sub-categories between innovations. Here, as with team size and unlike the age at first innovation, we see large differences across technological areas. This variation is again consistent with the predictions of the model. At the same time, this basic, cross-sectional variation in the probability of field jump is difficult to interpret: the probability of field jump will be tied to how broadly a technological category happens to be defined, which may vary to a large degree across categories. 20 These results can also be considered in a regression format. Pooling cross-sections and using application year dummies to take care of trends, the results are extremely similar. One can also adjust the time at first innovation by subtracting category-specific estimates of the time lag to get a closer estimate of an individual's education. One can also look at different age windows. The result that ages are nearly identical across fields is highly robust. 23 measure implies for our outcomes of interest.
For a continuous measure of the quantity of knowledge I will use the logarithm of the number of nodes (i.e., patents) in the citation "tree" behind any patent. 21 As usual, there is a truncation issue that needs to be considered: the data set does not contain citation information for patents issued before 1975, so we tend to see the recent part of the tree. The measure of underlying knowledge is then noisier the closer we are to 1975, and I will therefore focus on cross-sections later in the time period. A second issue is that the average tree size and its variance grow extremely rapidly in the time window, which makes it difficult to compare data across cross-sections without a normalized measure. Two obvious normalizations are: (1) a dummy for whether the tree size is greater than the withinperiod median; (2) the difference from the within-period mean tree size, normalized by the within-period standard deviation. Results are reported using the latter definition, as it is informationally richer, though either method shows similar results. Table 7 examines the relationship between team size and tree size in pooled crosssections, with and without various controls. I add a quadratic term for the variation in team size to help capture evident curvature, and we see that team size rises at an increasing rate as the measure of knowledge depth increases. For innovations with larger citation trees, the rise in team size is particularly strong. With very deep knowledge trees, an increase of one standard deviation in the tree size is associated with an average increase in team size of one person. The table shows that the cross-sectional relationship holds for domestic and foreign-source patents and when controlling for technological category, so that the variation appears both within fields and across them. Technological controls are perhaps best left out, however, since the variations in mean tree size across technological category may be equally of interest. Finally, we might be concerned that bigger teams simply have a greater propensity to cite, which results in larger trees. This concern proves unwarranted. Controlling for the variation in the direct citations made by each patent, we find that relationship actually strengthens. In fact, we see that bigger teams tend to cite less. This result gives us greater faith in the causative arrow implied by the regressions.
Next we turn to the age at first innovation. Table 8 examines, in pooled cross-sections, the relationship between age and knowledge for those individuals for whom we can be confident that they are innovating for the first time (see discussion above). The general conclusion from the table is that we must work hard to find a relationship, and at its largest it is very small. It is not robust to the specific age window, is reduced when controlling for the technological category, and disappears when controlling for the number of direct citations made. Taking a coefficient of 0.1 as the maximum estimate from the table, we find that an increase of one standard deviation in the knowledge measure leads to a 0.1 year increase in age. This coefficient may be attenuated given that our proxy measure of knowledge is, at best, noisy, but I conclude that there is at most only a weak relationship between the amount of knowledge underlying a patent and the age at first innovation.
Finally, Table 9 considers the relationship between the probability of field jump and the knowledge measure. The table shows a robust negative relationship: solo innovators are less likely to jump fields when their initial patent has a larger node count. If we identify a larger node count with a deeper area of knowledge, then this negative correlation is again consistent with the predictions of the model. However, I place less emphasis on this result.
The fact that the node count captures the recent part of the tree means that the measure is likely correlated not just with the total underlying knowledge but also with the recent ease of innovation. This effect could also explain the negative correlation. Innovators will be less likely to leave a fruitful area, which will be registered as a decreased probability of jumping fields.
Discussion
This paper is built on two observations. First, innovators are not born at the frontier of knowledge but must initially undertake significant education. Second, the distance to the frontier shifts over time. I investigate equilibrium implications of these two observations and then test these implications empirically. In this section I will review the results and consider them further in light of existing literatures. Two suggestive conclusions are drawn.
First, human capital decisions appear first-order in understanding important variations in 25 innovative activity across fields and over time. Second, a subset of the evidence points to a rising burden of knowledge.
The empirical work of Section 3 produces six key facts. We find that the age at first innovation is increasing over time while it shows no variation across widely different fields, as demanded by the theory. Meanwhile, team size and specialization are increasing over time and varying across fields, with greater teamwork and specialization the larger a measure for the amount of underlying knowledge. These time-series and cross-sectional patterns are all robust to many controls. The upward trends in age, teamwork, and specialization are robust across widely different technological areas and research environments. The upward trends in teamwork and specialization are also especially steep: teamwork is increasing by 17% per decade and the specialization measure by 6% per decade. The burden of knowledge mechanism can also speak to trends in the data aggregates currently debated in the growth literature. First of all, as indicated in Section 2.6, an increasing burden of knowledge provides one explanation for why high growth rates in the number of R&D workers have not led to increases in rates of TFP growth. Of further interest is the drop in total patent production per total researchers, which has been documented across a range of countries and industries and may go back as far as 1900 and even before (Machlup 1962 ). Certainly, not all researchers are engaging in patentable activities, and it is possible that much of this trend is explained by relatively rapid growth of research in basic science. 22 However, the results here indicate that among those specific individuals who produce patentable innovations, the ratio of patents to individuals is in fact declining. In all, the micro-evidence presented in this paper, together with other available microevidence and the aggregate data trends cited above, suggest general and multi-dimensional patterns that may all be understood within the knowledge burden model. While any individual piece of evidence could be explained by other means, the burden of knowledge model knits together a wide range of evidence within a single framework. Thinking carefully about the human capital investments faced by innovators leads to precise and empirically relevant cross-sectional and dynamic insights. Moreover, while the model has relevant organizational and growth implications regardless of whether the burden of knowledge rises or falls with time, the evidence suggests specifically that the burden of knowledge is increasing.
The model delivers this inference directly through increasing specialization and teamwork, but note further that a combination of greater specialization and greater educational attainment is especially difficult to reconcile without appealing to a greater knowledge burden. If innovators are becoming more specialized but the distance to the frontier is not increasing, then innovators should have required less education over time.
As emphasized in the model, the knowledge burden channel is not dispositive of other mechanisms, which operate independently and may also be important to innovator output. The general equilibrium setting of the model explicitly embraces popular stories in the literature regarding innovation exhaustion ("fishing out" stories), increasing innovation potential, and market size effects. Fishing-out stories are particularly interesting because they can provide an alternative or additional explanation for the data aggregates -patterns which have motivated that literature. While the trends in the data regarding team size, age, or specialization appear orthogonal to a fishing-out story, this orthogonality leaves room for a fishing-out mechanism alongside a rising burden of knowledge when one confronts aggregate data. 23 Defining precise micro-data tests for a fishing-out story is a challenge for future research. Differentiating between a fishing-out and knowledge burden mechanism is challenging on the basis of productivity alone, as any decrease in the size or rate of innovations can be explained by either narrowing expertise or innovation exhaustion.
If a rising burden of knowledge is an inevitable by-product of technological progress, then the model indicates pessimistic predictions for long-run growth. However, there are two kinds of escapes worth noting. First, as discussed in Section 2.6, if the value of knowledge increases sufficiently rapidly in Newton's original sense of "seeing farther" (i.e. χ is large), then the output of individual innovators may be sufficient, despite a rising educational burden, to sustain growth without increasing effort. While the 20th century's aggregate data patterns -rapidly increasing R&D effort but flat TFP growth -do not lead to such optimistic conclusions about the current balance of forces, there is nothing to say that this balance can't shift in the future.
Second, even if the stock of knowledge is accumulating over long periods of time, it may be that some future revolution in science can reset and simplify the knowledge space, causing a fall in the burden of knowledge (D(t) falls). Scientific revolutions -Kuhnian "paradigm" shifts -might therefore have significant benefits by easing the inter-generational transmission of knowledge. Related to this point, the efficiency of education -the rate at which we transfer knowledge from one generation to the next -becomes a policy parameter with first-order implications for the ultimate organization of innovative activity and for growth. Future improvements in the knowledge transfer rate could potentially overcome growth in the knowledge stock. While this transfer rate probably faces physiological limits, policy choices in education take on further importance, as policy features from teacher pay to curricular design and the need for a 'liberal arts' education all impact the rate at which human capital can be transferred to the young. 23 The fact that increasing team size appears to explain recent declines in the ratio of aggregate patents per researcher, as discussed above, does bring that particular aggregate fact closer to the burden of knowledge explanation. 28 
Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1.i L(t, s) = L R (t) ∀s
First I generalize the innovator's income function to allow the possibility that not all ideas are feasible to implement. Then I show that innovators will array themselves evenly around the circle.
(1) Define p i (t) such that ∀k > p i (t) the necessary teammates do not exist and ∀k ≤ p i (t) the necessary teammates do exist. The probability that an idea k is feasible is then F (p i (t) ). The innovator's expected income at the time of their birth t 0 is a generalized version of (5) that allows for the possibility that an idea is infeasible:
Note that, in any equilibrium, b * i > 0 and F (p i (t)) > 0 by the arbitrage condition (12), since otherwise U R&D i = 0 but U wage > 0. Moreover, there must exist an arbitrarily small such that 0 < < b * i . (2) By contradiction, imagine that
where s 0 > s 00 > s 0 − . That is, there exist two neighboring points, a relatively crowded point s 0 and a less crowded point s 00 . Without loss of generality, choose individual i at s 0 such that b * i ≤ b j for some j at s 0 , j 6 = i. If this individual i at s 0 were to shift to s 00 , then the access to potential teammates remains unchanged. (The individual can always hire someone in L(t 0 , s 0 ) as a teammate, and everyone else at that point has weakly greater expertise.) Therefore b p i (t) = p i (t)+ , and the probability that an idea k is feasible is weakly increasing with this deviation since for any distribution function
Therefore, from (20) and the equilibrium condition (11), the choice s 0 (i.e. the crowded location) can only be an equilibrium for
Given the continuity of L with time, L(t, s 0 ) > L(t, s 00 ) for all t in some interval [t 0 , t 00 ]. Therefore, the expected income to innovator i in the interval [t 0 , t 00 ] must be strictly less with the crowded choice s 0 then with the less crowded choice s 00 . Therefore, innovator i must believe that
That is, eventually the relatively crowded choice must produce greater income. But multiplying both sides of this expression by the constant e −φ(t 0 −t 00 ) , we see that in the subgame for those born at time t 00 no person would choose s 00 . Hence L (t 00 , s 00 ) is not increasing, L(t 00 , s 0 ) > L(t 00 , s 00 ), and there is no finite t 00 at which (22) holds. Hence (21) cannot hold. Hence, by contradiction, no such point s 00 can exist and therefore there can be no points on the circle where the mass is less than any other point. QED.
Proof of Proposition 1.ii
Differentiate (14) with respect to b i , producing the first order condition:
In other words,
, the first order condition is just E * (τ ) /U * (τ ) = ε/β − 1, which is a constant. QED. (Note: An interior maximum requires ε > β. If this condition does not hold, then innovators will choose to learn all available knowledge, b * i = 1. Such a corner solution can also emerge when β < ε if the unique maximum described by (23) occurs where b * i > 1. These cases, where the innovator learns all available knowledge, are less interesting and are left aside in further analysis.)
Proof of Proposition 1.iii
Given arbitrage in lifetime income (12) , all innovators in the same cohort have identical
for all innovators in the same cohort. QED.
Proof of Proposition 2
If g is constant, we can take logs and differentiate (15) with respect to time to see that,
To define g _ θ , note first that the average productivity of innovators is the sum of the productivity of each cohort weighted by the fraction of that cohort in the population. 24
The growth rate of θ(τ ) with respect to τ is just βg b * , which is seen by taking logs of the definition of θ (equation (9)), using the equilibrium result b i = b * (τ ), and differentiating with respect to τ .
We can therefore integrate (25) to find that
The steady-state growth rate in _ θ(t) is therefore equivalent to the steady-state growth rate in θ(t), so that
is the productivity of the latest cohort of innovators at the time of their birth. Therefore g θ is just χg + βg b * − σg L , which is seen by taking logs in the definition of θ(t), and differentiating with respect to t. Therefore, 24 The size of a cohort at its birth is (g L + φ)L(τ ), so the surviving size of that cohort at some time t > τ is (gL + φ)L(τ )e −φ(t−τ ) , and the fraction of the population L (t) who belong to that cohort is
Note that E * /U * is constant (Proposition 1.ii), which implies g E * = g U * . Furthermore, from (13) , g U * = g, which implies g E * = g. From (6) , g E * = 1/ε (g b * − g D ), and from (7), g D = δg. Therefore g b * = ( 1 ε − δ)g, a result presented in (17) . Inserting (17) into (26), the result into (24) , and rearranging produces the expression for steady-state growth in equation (16) . QED.
The growth rate of b * is given in (??). Hence g b * < 0 iff δ > 1/ε. QED.
Proof of Corollary 1.iii
Recall that k, the breadth of expertise required to implement an idea, has a smooth distribution function F (k). A cohort with breadth of expertise b will therefore produce a team of size 1 with probability F (b), a team of size 2 with probability F ((n − 1)b) . Collecting terms in this expression, team(b) = n − P n−1 j=1 F (jb) where j indexes a particular realization of team size. Differentiating with respect to b shows that, dteam(b)/db = − P n−1 j=1 jf (jb) where f (k) = dF/dk is the probability density function corresponding to F . Given that a density function is weakly positive at any point, we see that team size is weakly increasing as b falls. Hence the conditions for average team size to increase with time are identical to the condition for expertise to narrow; i.e. if and only if δ > 1/ε. QED. 
Noting that F (jb; b) = R jb 0 f (k; b)dk, we can use Leibniz's rule to differentiate (27) with respect to b and thereby define a necessary and sufficient condition for team size to increase with specialization:
The second term on the left hand side is recognized from equation (??) and acts to make team size increase with specialization. The effect of the first term is ambiguous, however, so that the effect of specialization on team size cannot be signed without considering distribution-specific properties. We can gain some intuition for this condition by considering the simple case where k is drawn from a uniform distribution.
Using (28) , it is then straightforward to show that α < 1 ⇔ dteam(b)/db < 0. Noting that the mean of k is E (k) = 1 2 b α , it is also straightforward to show that α is the elasticity of E(k) with respect to b. Therefore, we see that team size will be increasing with specialization so long as the elasticity of E(k) with respect to expertise is less than 1. In other words, team size will be increasing as long as innovators' average "reach", given by E(k), does not decline faster than their average "grasp", given by b.
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof follows exactly the same structure as the proof of Proposition 1 and is omitted for brevity.
Proof of Corollary 2.i
Arbitrage implies a common U * (τ ) within every cohort. Since E * (τ )/U * (τ ) is a constant (Proposition 3.ii), every innovator must choose the same E * (τ ). QED.
Proof of Corollary 2.ii
All innovators in a cohort, by Corollary 2.i, choose the same amount of education, 
By Corollary 2.ii, an innovator cohort within a circle of knowledge j will have narrower expertise the greater the depth of knowledge. By the same logic as in the proof of Corollary 1.iii, narrower expertise is associated with larger team size. QED
Extended Model: A Time Cost to Education
The following model is a generalization of the model in the text. The model in the text allows for an additively separable cost of education, E, where this cost can be thought of as either an out-of-pocket expense or a direct utility cost of effort. Here I will introduce an additional opportunity cost of education: choosing more education results in a longer period at the beginning of life when one does not earn income. In particular, define T = α ln(bD) as the duration of education., which is monotonically increasing in the amount of knowledge learned, bD. The model is as before, except innovator income is defined by
in place of (5) . Equilibrium analysis follows mostly as before. The equilibrium choice of s still requires that innovators spread out evenly around the circle. The equilibrium choice of b * i becomes analytically more tedious, as the choice of breadth of expertise now additionally affects one limit of the integral in (29) . Using Leibniz's rule in differentiating (29) , in addition to the definitions of v and E in (10) and (6), we can write the first-order condition for the choice of b, with some manipulation, as:
where
This is a generalization of (23) -the simpler case with no time-cost, where the right hand side of (30) is zero (∂T /∂b = 0). Here, given the definition of T ,
we will proceed by focusing on the equilibrium along a balanced-growth path. On the balanced growth path, X grows at rate g, while L R and M grow at rate g L . Under these conditions, it is easily shown that
Noting that U * (τ ) = Π * (τ ) − E * (τ ), we have the result
In other words, we have the same result as Proposition 1.ii (with the exception that we are now focusing on the steady-state growth path), from which Proposition 1.iii, Proposition 3, and Corollaries 1 and 2 will follow. Since both E and T are monotonically increasing in the amount of knowledge learned (bD), rising E * along the growth path (Corollary 1.i) implies that T * , the duration of education, also rises along the growth path. Similarly, common E * across fields (Corollary 2.i) implies that T * is the same across fields.
The one set of results that must be generalized is Proposition 2, which defines the steady-state growth rate. The steady-state growth rate is now an implicit function of the model parameters. (The derivation follows along the lines of the proof of Proposition 2). In the special case that α = 0, so that there is no time-cost to education, the steady-state growth is given by (16) , as before. In the special case where specialization doesn't change with time (ε = 1/δ), the growth rate is given by
Here the effect of the burden of knowledge on growth is felt entirely through the time cost of education. Larger values of the parameter α, which implies a higher sensitivity of educational duration to the amount of knowledge one learns, causes lower growth rates, since one spends a smaller portion of the one's life-cycle actively producing innovations.
Data Appendix
The reader is referred to Hall et al (2001) for a detailed discussion of their patent data set. This appendix focuses on the age information collected to augment the Hall et al data.
Age data was collected using the website www.AnyBirthday.com, which requires a name and zip code to produce a match. As is seen in Table A .1, 30% of U.S. inventors listed a zip code on at least one of their patent applications, and of these inventors AnyBirthday.com produced a birth date in 25% of the cases. While the number of observations produced by AnyBirthday.com is large, it represents only 7.5% of U.S. inventors. This Appendix explores the causes and implications of this selection. The first question is why zip code information is available for only certain inventors. The second question is why AnyBirthday.com produces a match only one-quarter of the time. The third question is whether this selection appears to matter. Table A .2 compares how patent rights are assigned across samples. The table shows clearly that zip code information is virtually always supplied when the inventor has yet to assign the rights; conversely, zip code information is never provided when the rights are already assigned. Patent rights are usually assigned to private corporations (80% of the time) and remain unassigned in the majority of the other cases (17% of the time). An unassigned patent indicates only that the inventor(s) have not yet assigned the patent at the time it is granted. Presumably, innovators who provide zip codes are operating outside of binding contracts with corporations, universities, or other agencies that would automatically acquire any patent rights. The zip-code subset is therefore not a random sample, but is capturing a distinct subset of innovators who, at least at one point, were operating independently. Despite this distinction, this subset may not be substantially different from other innovators: the last column of Table A .2 indicates that, when looking at the other patents produced by these innovators, they have a similar propensity to assign them to corporations as the U.S. population average.
The nature of the selection introduced by AnyBirthday.com is more difficult to identify. The website reports a database of 135 million individuals and reports to have built its database using "public records". Access to public records is a contentious legal issue. 25 Public disclosure of personal information is proscribed at the federal level by the Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act of 1974. At the state and local level however, rules vary. Birth date and address information are both available through motor vehicle departments and their electronic databases are likely to be the main source of AnyBirthday.com's records. 26 The availability of birth date information is therefore very likely to be related to local institutional rules regarding motor vehicle departments. Geography thus will influence the presence of innovators in the age sample, and a further issue in selection may involve the geographic mobility of the innovator, among other factors. The influence of this selection, together with the implications of assignment status, can be assessed by comparing observable means in the population across subsamples. Table A .3 considers average team size, which is a source of further differences. Patents with provided zip codes have smaller team sizes than the U.S. average; team sizes in the subset of these patents for which the age of one innovator is known are slightly larger, but still smaller than the U.S. average. Controlling for other patent observables, in particular the assignment status, reduces the mean differences and brings the age sample quite closely in line with the U.S. mean. (See the last two columns of the table.) Having examined a number of other observables in the data, such as citations received and average tree size, I find that relatively small differences tend to exist in the raw data, and that these can be either entirely or largely explained by controlling for assignment status and team size. Most importantly, the age results in the text are all robust to the inclusion of assignment status, team size, and any other available controls.
Finally, looking at team size, specialization, and time lag trends in the age subsample, the results are similar in sign and significance as those presented in Section 4. The rate of increase in specialization is larger, and the rate of increase in team size is smaller. The time lag shows no trend. Reexamining trends in the entire data set by assignment status, I find that the team size trend is weaker among the unassigned category, which likely explains the weaker trend in the age subset. Similarly, I find that the specialization trend is stronger among the unassigned category, which likely explains the stronger trend in the age subset.
I conclude therefore that while the age subset is not a random sample of the U.S. innovator population, the differences tend to be explainable with other observables and, on the basis of including such observables in the analysis, the age results appear robust. 25 Repeated requests to AnyBirthday.com to define their sources more explicitly have yet to produce a response. 26 A federal law, the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, was introduced to give individuals increased privacy. The law requires motor vehicle departments to receive explicit prior consent from an individual before disclosing their personal information. However, the law makes an exception for cases where motor vehicles departments provide information to survey and marketing organizations. In that case, individual's consent is assumed unless the individual has opted-out on their own initiative. See Gellman (1995) for an in-depth discussion of the laws and legal history surrounding public records. (iv) Upward trends persist when run separately for each technological field. Using the broad classification (six categories), the trends range from a low of .018 for "Other" to a high of .037 for "Chemical". Using the narrower classification scheme (thirty-six categories), the trends range from a low of .007 for "Apparel &Textile" to .051 for "Organic Compounds". The smallest t-statistic for any of these trends is 7.76. (v) Assignee code controls are seven dummy variables that define who holds the rights to the patent. Most patent rights are held by US or foreign corporations (80%), while a minority remain unassigned (17%) at the time the patent is issued. (v) Assignee code controls are seven dummy variables that define who holds the rights to the patent. Table A .2 describes the assignee codes in further detail. The declining probability of field jump persists when the trend is examined within each assignment code, although the significance of the trend disappears in the rarer classifications. 1975-1993 1975-1993 1975-1993 1975-1993 1975-1993 1975-1993 Mean (ii) All specifications consider "fast" innovators --only those consecutive patents with no more than 3 years between applications and with no more than 3 years delay between application and grant. (See discussion in text.) (iii) Specifications (1) (ii) Probability of field jump is probability of switching categories for solo innovators using 36-category measure. (5) and (6) consider separately patents from domestic vs. foreign sources. Specification (7) considers cross-sections from the later part of the time period.
(ii) Normalized Variation in Tree Size is the deviation from the year mean tree size, divided by the year standard deviation in tree size. "Tree size" is the log of the number of nodes in the citations tree behind any patent. Table 1 because a few patents do not cite other US patents, hence no citation tree can be built; these patents are dropped from the analysis. (6) consider innovators in the 23-33 age window. Specification (7) considers slightly younger innovators, and Specification (8) considers the latter half of the 23-33 age window. Specifications (6) considers cross-sections pooled over the entire time period; the other specifications focus on the post-1985 period, for which we can be confident that we are witnessing an innovator's first patent.
(ii) Normalized Variation in Tree Size is the deviation from the year mean tree size, divided by the year standard deviation in tree size. "Tree size" is the log of the number of nodes in the citations tree behind any patent.
(iii) Normalized Variation in Direct Citations Made captures variation in the number of citations to prior art listed on a patent application. It is the deviation from the year mean number of citations, divided by the year standard deviation in the number of citations.
(iv) The number of observations here is slightly smaller than for the time trend analysis in Table 2 because a few patents do not cite other US patents, hence no citation tree can be built; these patents are dropped from the analysis. (4) consider the entire set of solo inventors. Specification (5) considers only those solo inventors who meet the criteria in Specifications (1) through (6) in Table 3 (to help control for any truncation bias in the specialization measure -see the discussion of Table 3 in the text). Specification (6) considers the same data as Specification (5), but only looks at cross-sections in the later part of the time period.
(ii) The dependent variable is 0 if an inventor does not switch fields between two consecutive innovations. The field is defined using the 414-category technological class definition of the USPTO.
(iii) Normalized Variation in Tree Size is the deviation from the year mean tree size, divided by the year standard deviation in tree size. "Tree size" is the log of the number of nodes in the citations tree behind any patent. (ii) A "unique inventor" is defined by having same first name, last name, and middle initial. (ii) US patents are those for which first inventor listed with the patent has a US address.
(iii) The Birth Data columns consider those US patents with zip code information for which AnyBirthday.com produced a birth date. The first Birth Data column considers the specific patents on which AnyBirthday.com was able to match. The last column considers all other patents by that innovator, identifying the innovator by last name, first name, and middle initial.
(iv) Unassigned patents are those for which the patent rights were still held by the original inventor(s) at the time the patent was granted; these patents may or may not have been assigned after the grant date. 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 .51
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